The recent 7th July 2025 judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) in Logo v Payone GmbH and Others offers a careful clarification of existing legal principles under the Equality Act 2010 and raises subtle but important questions around procedural justice in the employment litigation context. While the decision does not purport to alter doctrine or establish new precedent, its measured intervention into the reasoning of the lower court reveals the complex balance courts must strike between procedural discipline and substantive redress in discrimination claims.
The central issues in the appeal revolved around time limits for bringing claims under s.123 of the Equality Act 2010, and the threshold for establishing unlawful harassment under s.26 of the same Act. The facts themselves were not substantially in dispute. The claimant, a former employee of a now troubled German financial services firm operating in the UK, alleged a series of race-related acts including: (1) an incident in which a colleague painted their face black as part of a workplace skit or event, (2) a racially derogatory comment made at a work dinner by a senior employee, and (3) the circulation of a “Pure Blonde” beer advertisement posted to a work WhatsApp group without any explanation.
The Employment Tribunal had found that the first two incidents did indeed amount to unlawful harassment within the meaning of s.26(1)(b) (i.e., having the effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating or hostile environment), but declined to grant a remedy on the basis that the claims had been brought out of time and that there was insufficient justification for extending the three-month limitation period. In respect of the third incident, the Tribunal unanimously rejected the claim, albeit on a split rationale.
On appeal, the EAT engaged in a detailed structured analysis of the Tribunal’s reasoning on both the limitation and merits issues. The most significant findings relate to how the Tribunal approached the “just and equitable” test in s.123(1)(b) and the assessment of “prejudice” in exercising that discretion. The EAT held that the Tribunal had erred in law by taking into account irrelevant considerations, namely an asserted prejudice to the respondent’s memory that was not supported by the factual record, while simultaneously failing to consider the clear prejudice to the claimant in being denied a remedy for unlawful conduct that the Tribunal itself had found to have occurred.
This was not, the EAT emphasised, a case where the Tribunal’s evaluative judgment was simply open to reasonable disagreement. Rather, the error was one of legal logic: having determined that it was able to make robust factual findings in relation to the impugned conduct, including the mental states of the actors involved, it was inconsistent to then find that delay in bringing the claim had caused substantial prejudice to the respondent. This internal inconsistency, coupled with the Tribunal’s failure to engage with the claimant’s explanation for delay (including fears of reprisal or job insecurity), rendered the decision on limitation unsustainable in law. The EAT concluded that the Tribunal’s determination had fallen “outside the very wide ambit within which different views may reasonably be taken about what is just and equitable”.
What follows from this is procedurally significant. The matters are to be remitted to the same Tribunal to re-determine the question of time limits, this time applying the correct legal framework and taking proper account of both parties’ respective prejudices. Importantly, the EAT did not substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal, underscoring the principle that appellate courts intervene on errors of law, not fact, and that discretionary assessments by first instance Tribunals must be respected provided they are legally coherent.
The EAT also addressed the Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to the “Pure Blonde” advertisement claim. Here, the majority of the Tribunal had rejected the harassment claim on the basis that there was no racial connection to the advert, which they construed narrowly as a humorous depiction tied to a brand of beer. The minority accepted that there was a racial element, but nonetheless concluded that the connection was “tenuous and weak”, and that it was not reasonable for the conduct to have had a harassing effect under s.26(1)(b). The EAT’s analysis did not overturn the factual finding as to intent acknowledging that the respondent had not intended offence but did find that the Tribunal had failed to properly apply the “related to” limb of s.26(1)(a), and that its reasoning on the “effect” limb was flawed in its over-reliance on the perpetrator’s intentions rather than the perception and experience of the claimant.
As the EAT observed, the correct approach under s.26 requires a structured inquiry: into (i) whether the conduct is related to a protected characteristic, (ii) whether it had the effect of violating dignity or creating a hostile environment, and (iii) whether it was reasonable for it to have that effect, taking into account the claimant’s perception, the circumstances of the case, and the objective standard. The EAT concluded that the Tribunal’s analysis was incomplete and that it failed to give proper attention to how a racialised image, even if not intended to offend, could nonetheless have a significant and distressing impact in a workplace setting.
These are nuanced but meaningful points of law. The EAT’s ruling makes clear that tribunals must not allow subjective perceptions of humour or benign intent to override a proper assessment of context, especially where imagery invokes historically loaded ideas such as racial purity or exclusion. This is not to say that all such imagery is per se unlawful; but its effect must be assessed through a rigorous application of the legal tests not through intuitive or cultural assumptions.
The EAT’s decision, while limited in scope, offers a helpful reminder that the application of equality law requires more than a mechanical or procedural approach. It underscores the importance of ensuring that procedural considerations do not inadvertently undermine the substantive protections the legislation is designed to afford. The judgment invites courts and parties alike to approach discrimination litigation not merely as an adversarial process, but as part of a broader legal and societal commitment to upholding dignity, fairness, and respect in the workplace.
The Tribunal is to re-hear aspects of the case, including the time limit determinations and the effect of the conduct. It is also open to the Tribunal, upon making further findings of fact, to consider whether these incidents cumulatively contribute to the broader claim of unfair dismissal. Issue 15, which the EAT noted had only been partially analysed, may yet be brought back into view.
In sum, the EAT’s decision is a measured, reasoned, and fair recalibration of legal process. It reminds us that justice requires both procedural integrity and substantive sensitivity. For litigants, particularly those unrepresented or marginalised, it affirms that the law, when properly applied, remains capable of hearing them. For organisations, it invites not only legal compliance but cultural self-examination.
In an age where institutions are increasingly judged not just by what they do, but how they respond when challenged, this decision is not just about doctrine. It is about ethos.
Disclaimer:
This article is intended for informational and academic discussion only. It does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. The views expressed are those of the author and are not those of any institution or party. If you require legal advice or assistance, you should consult a qualified legal professional.
